Introduction
Despite the best efforts of the academic economics community and some politicians, ordinary people remain sceptical regarding the benefits of the international economy. While the 'anti-capitalism' or 'anti-globalization' protest movement may not be representative of the population at large, nonetheless many remain opposed to the free international movement of people, commodities and capital. Table 1 reports the results of a major international survey (described in Section 4) carried out in 24 countries (in the OECD, central and eastern Europe, and the Phillippines) in 1995. Of the many questions which respondents were asked to answer, two directly bear on their attitudes towards globalization. The first asked to what extent they agreed with the statement that their country 'should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy;' responses were ordered from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). In addition, respondents were asked if the number of immigrants to their economy should be increased a lot (1), a little (2), remain the same (3), be reduced a little (4) or reduced a lot (5). Table 1 reports the mean response to these questions in each country: a score greater than 3 indicates that on average respondents were leaning towards greater restriction, rather than freer trade or immigration. In every country in the sample, respondents on average favoured lowering the number of immigrants; in every country in the sample bar 2 (the Netherlands and Japan) respondents on average favoured limiting imports.
History suggests that we need to understand what drives these anxieties, since globalization is not irreversible: rather, it has periodically been supplanted by the forces of disintegration. Sometimes, these forces have been unleashed by war; at other times, by world depression; and sometimes they have arisen as an endogenous political response to the 4 distributional consequences of globalization itself . O'Rourke (1997) shows how the different responses of European countries to the influx of cheap grain at the end of the 19 th century can be understood in terms of the different distributional impact which the grain invasion had in each; Timmer and Williamson (1998) show that the best predictor of countries' decisions to tighten immigration restrictions in the late 19 th century is the relative income of unskilled workers. In turn, the rising inequality which provoked a gradual restriction of immigration into the New World was largely a result of the immigration of unskilled workers (Williamson 1997; Hatton and Williamson 1998) .
Might history repeat itself, and might globalization once again go into reverse, even in the absence of a major world conflict? In order to get to grips with this question, we need to understand the underlying causes of voters' preferences regarding globalization. This paper examines those preferences, focussing on just one dimension of globalization: international migration. While there are many variables that can potentially determine attitudes towards migration, one central focus of this paper will be the extent to which these preferences are driven by purely economic considerations. Do citizens look to their pocket books when deciding where they stand on immigration, or do such non-economic factors as nationalism or chauvinism also 
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The major conclusions there were twofold. First, non-economic factors such as nationalism and chauvinism do indeed play a major role in determining attitudes, with nationalism, and especially chauvinism, having a major positive effect on protectionist attitudes. Second, individual preferences relate to individual skill levels in a manner fully consistent with HO theory. That is, in rich countries being high-skilled is negatively correlated with protectionist attitudes, other things being equal; but this negative correlation declines in poorer countries, and is actually replaced with a positive (if small, and statistically insignificant) correlation in the poorest countries in the sample. (Mayda and Rodrik (2001) independently arrive at very similar conclusions, using the same dataset.)
The HO model yields very clear predictions about the links between skill and attitudes towards imports, since trade in the HO model is driven by comparative advantage. By contrast, immigration is driven by absolute advantage (i.e. absolute factor price differentials, namely wage gaps) rather than by comparative advantage (i.e. relative factor prices, for example the ratio of skilled to unskilled wages). Section 2 of the paper will therefore review what trade theory has to say about the determinants of attitudes towards both trade and migration, as well as the relationship between those attitudes. Section 3 will then introduce a broad historical perspective on the matter, by reviewing the late 19 th century evidence that suggests that rising immigration barriers in the New World were driven by economic factors rather than by racism or xenophobia. In particular, immigration restrictions were driven by rising inequality, which was itself a by-product of the mass migration of unskilled workers from Europe to the New World. The fact that the mass migrations of the late 19 th century largely involved unskilled workers is thus crucial to the argument. The section 6 will then go on to discuss how the migration environment is now different from that pertaining 100 years ago, both in terms of the size and nature of the migration flows, and in terms of the types of migration policies which governments are adopting.
Section 4 then introduces the survey data which are used in the paper. Section 5 estimates a series of equations relating individual attitudes towards immigration in 24 countries to individual level characteristics, including skills, nationalism and chauvinism, age and gender, place of birth, geographical mobility, attitudes towards trade, and other factors. Section 6 concludes.
Theory
Standard HO trade theory is quite clear in its predictions regarding who should benefit and who should lose from free trade in commodities. Imagine a two factor world in which countries are distinguished only by their relative endowments of skilled and unskilled workers.
The relative wages of skilled workers will be lower, other things being equal, in skill abundant countries (which we will denote by R, and refer to as rich countries) than in unskilled labour abundant countries (denoted by P, and referred to as poor countries): we have (w S /w US ) R < (w S /w US ) P . It is this inequality that drives comparative advantage: the rich countries will export skill intensive goods, while the poor abundant countries will export unskilled labour intensive goods. The result is then relative factor price convergence (or, in the limit, factor price equalization): when countries move towards freer trade, the relative price of skilled labour rises in rich countries, and falls in poor countries. Moreover, the abundant factor gains in real terms in all countries, while the scarce factor loses. Thus the skilled should favour free trade in rich 7 countries, while they should favour protection in poor countries; the unskilled in rich countries should favour protection, while the unskilled in poor countries should support free trade.
In a pure HO world in which technology is identical across countries, and in which countries are only distinguished by their relative endowments of skilled and unskilled labour, it is again possible to make unambiguous predictions about who should favour immigration and who should not. This is the case, even though international migration is not driven by comparative advantage and relative factor prices, but by absolute advantage, and by absolute factor price differentials. In a pure HO world, the real wages of skilled workers will be higher in poor countries (where skilled workers are scarce) than in rich countries (where they are abundant), while unskilled wages will be higher in rich countries than in poor countries: we have (in real terms) w S P > w S R , but w U R > w U P . Thus, we should observe skilled workers migrating from rich to poor countries, and unskilled workers migrating from poor to rich countries.
Immigration will hurt skilled workers in poor countries, but benefit the unskilled there; in poor countries the unskilled should favour immigration, while skilled workers should oppose it. The situation is the reverse in rich countries: immigration will hurt the unskilled, but benefit skilled workers. Thus skilled workers should be pro-immigration, while the unskilled should oppose it.
Note that in such a pure 2-country, 2-factor HO world, in which countries are distinguished solely by their relative factor endowments, agents are consistent in their attitudes towards globalization. That is, in rich countries skilled workers favour both trade and immigration, while unskilled workers are protectionist and anti-immigration. In poor countries, it is the unskilled who are liberal in their attitudes towards both trade and immigration, while the skilled favour both protection and immigration restrictions. This symmetry reflects the fact that 8 in a pure 2-factor HO world in which technology is identical across countries, trade and factor flows are substitutes: they have identical effects on factor prices (i.e. they both lead to relative and absolute factor price convergence), and thus the more you have of one dimension of globalization, the less incentive there will be for the other dimension to take place. In such a world, scarce factors lose as a result of either trade or immigration, while abundant factors gain from either. One immediate political consequence of the fact that trade and migration are substitutes for each other is that agents who are protectionist should also be anti-immigration:
both trade and immigration have to be simultaneously restricted, since either phenomenon will hurt the scarce factor. Protection without immigration restrictions will not work, since protection without immigration restrictions will simply lead to more immigration; immigration barriers without protection will not work, since immigration barriers on their own will simply lead to more trade (Mundell 1957 ).
Things get a lot more complicated when we admit the possibility that technology may differ across countries, or that there are more than two factors of production. First, it is no longer the case that trade and factor flows are necessarily substitutes: they could instead be complements. For example, Markusen (1983) shows that technological differences between countries can lead to trade and factor mobility being complements; while in the context of a three-factor model such as the specific factors model, trade and factor mobility can be either substitutes or complements (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999, Chapter 13). Second, if technology is better in the rich country, or if the rich country is better endowed with some third factor of production than the poor country, then it no longer follows from an inequality such as (w S /w US ) R < (w S /w US ) P that skilled workers will migrate from rich to poor countries: it is quite possible that 9 (w S /w US ) R < (w S /w US ) P , but that (in real terms) w S R > w S P . In this case, skilled workers will move from poor (unskilled labour abundant) countries to rich (skill abundant) countries: unskilled workers will move in the same direction as skilled workers. This is, of course, what happens in the real world, suggesting that richer countries do indeed enjoy superior technology to poor countries, and that endowments alone cannot explain differences in income, or for that matter trade patterns and factor flows. The issue of whether skilled or unskilled workers should be more anti-immigration in rich countries thus becomes unclear. Presumably it depends on whether immigration predominantly involves skilled or unskilled workers; but which is true is not immediately obvious.
In fact, there is a large theoretical literature which asks whether migrants are more likely to be skilled or unskilled, but this literature tends not to be located within standard HO trade models. For example, Katz and Stark (1984) argue that asymmetric information can lead to migration flows disproportionately involving unskilled workers, since employers in rich countries may not be able to correctly discern the skill levels of potential migrants; although the equilibrium outcome can change if various devices reinstating informational symmetry are employed (Katz and Stark 1987) . An alternative theory is provided by Borjas (1987) , who adapts Roy's (1951) model of occupational self-selection to the issue of migration. The conclusions of the analysis is that there will be positive self-selection of migrants if (a) the correlation between the earnings which they receive in the home and destination countries is sufficiently high; and (b) if income is more dispersed in the destination country than in the home country. On the other hand, there will be negative self-selection if (a) the correlation between the earnings which they receive in the home and destination countries is sufficiently high; and (b) if income is less 1 In principle, self-selection should depend not only on income distribution within host countries, but on the relationship between host country and source country income distribution. A complete test of the Borjas theory would thus involve calculating source country distributions for each host country. In this paper I make the simplifying assumption that source country distributions are sufficiently similar for all host countries that self-selection varies across host countries based on differences in host country distributions alone. 10 dispersed in the destination country than in the home country.
O' Rourke and Sinnott (2001) stress that it is important, when using survey data to test HO trade theory, to use data for more than one country. For example, previous findings (e.g. Scheve and Slaughter 2001) that the unskilled are more protectionist than the skilled in the US are not on their own evidence in favour of the HO view, since in principle it might be the case that the unskilled everywhere were protectionist, which would be completely at variance with HO theory. It is the variation in the correlation between skills and attitudes across countries that is crucial in testing the theory. In this respect, it seems easier to empirically test the Borjas theory of migrant self-selection than other theories stressing asymmetric information. To test the Borjas theory, we need to see how the correlation between skills and attitudes towards immigration varies across countries, and in particular to see if this correlation varies systematically with domestic income distribution.
1 Data on income distribution are more easily available across countries than information on the relative importance of informational asymmetries across countries, and so it is the Borjas theory (along with HO theory) which is the focus of this paper.
History

3.A. Late 19 th century migration in comparative context
Late 19 th century labour markets were clearly more globalized than today. Although the barriers to immigration that are the focus of this section were being erected by the end of the was not until the 1880s that the cumulative European migration exceeded that of the African (Eltis 1983, p. 255) . In the first three decades after 1846, European intercontinental emigration averaged around 300,000 per annum; the numbers more than doubled in the next two decades, and rose to more than a million per annum after 1900 (Chiswick and Hatton 2001 , Figure 1 ).
There were also significant migrations within Europe and the New World, as well as substantial intercontinental emigration from Asia.
One feature of these 19 th century migrations that deserves to be noted is that they were ultimately self-limiting. That is, in those countries where the process had time to run its course before the intervention of the First World War, emigration followed an inverse U-shape, first rising and then declining (Hatton and Williamson 1998) . Demographic forces were an important cause of the upswing, with path-dependence playing a strong reinforcing role; but eventually emigration led to international wage-convergence, and this led to emigration rates falling in 12 countries such as Ireland.
As was the case with trade and capital flows, this dimension of globalization went into reverse after 1914. European emigration had averaged over 1.2 million per annum in the decade before the war, but was less than half that between 1916 and 1930; and during the 1930s it was lower than it had been in the late 1840s ( Table 2 ).
However, this recovery is not yet complete. The world stock of migrants was 2.3% of the total world population in both 1965 and 1990. Within Western Europe, the share of migrants in the total population increased from 3.6% to 6.1% over the same period, while within North America, the migrant share increased from 6% to 8.6% (Zlotnik 1999 
3.C. Immigration policy in the 20 th century
The late 19 th century experience indicates that absent international institutions which can restrain individual countries' policies, globalization can undermine itself. Labour market integration undermined itself by increasing income inequality in the New World, which in turn led to immigration barriers. In a similar vein, cheap agricultural imports into Europe spurred a protectionist retreat across much of the Continent (Bairoch 1989 ).
In the trade sphere, the lesson that was learned from this experience was that international institutions were needed to spur international cooperation. Thus, the interwar League of Nations was supposed, among other things, to provide a forum within which countries could agree to lower trade barriers; and even though it failed dismally, the promise of the League would eventually be fulfilled via the GATT and WTO. The history of international migration is quite different in this regard, since there was never an international organisation dedicated to the removal of barriers to international migration. Both the French and German delegations at
Versailles suggested that free migration be stitched into the post-World War I international economic architecture, but these proposals came to nought (James 2001, pp. 176-7 James has gone so far as to speculate that the inability of countries in the interwar period to solve their economic problems by exporting people prompted calls for territorial expansion (James 2001, pp. 184-5) .
While the post-1945 settlement did involve the promotion of freer trade, migration was once again left for individual countries to decide. The result has been enormous wage gaps between rich and poor countries, and equally enormous potential gains to freer migration: Hamilton and Whalley (1984) famously estimated that free migration could as much as double world income, gains that make the estimated effects of world trade rounds seem trivial. Within this overall context of restriction, immigration policies have taken a variety of forms (Chiswick and Hatton 2003) . In the early postwar years, several European countries tried to attract lowskilled workers on a temporary basis, and short-term contracts for unskilled migrants have also , 1999 Taylor and Williamson 1997) . Furthermore, since the emigration predominantly involved unskilled workers, it raised the incomes of the unskilled relative to average incomes in emigrant economies, making those economies more equal (Williamson 1997) . From the point of view of poor countries, therefore, international labour markets offered not only higher living standards but more equal societies. Today's rich country immigration policies not only prevent developing economies from raising their average living standards via emigration; by admitting skilled workers rather than unskilled workers, these policies may actually hurt developing economies via the brain drain effect, and also make them less equal (by raising the relative wages of skilled workers). individual-level preferences regarding trade must lie at the heart of any rational choice account of policy-formation, and this paper follows them in using individual survey data. However, while
Scheve and Slaughter use survey data for just one country, the US, we use data for 20. The next section introduces our data set. The ISSP national identity data set includes a wide range of indicators of nationalist attitudes. Rather than focussing on just one or two of these as indicators of what is, after all, a complex phenomenon, the approach taken here is to seek to identify an underlying dimension (or dimensions) of nationalism that would be measured by a subset (or subsets) of the items. We focus on the following seven questions (versions implemented in Ireland, other country/nationality labels substituted as appropriate):
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• "Generally speaking, Ireland is a better country than most other countries"
• "The world would be a better place if people from other countries were more like the Irish"
• "I would rather be a citizen of Ireland than of any other country in the world"
• "It is impossible for people who do not share Irish customs and traditions to become fully
Irish"
• "People should support their country even if the country is in the wrong"
• "Ireland should follow its own interests, even if this leads to conflicts with other nations"
• "How important do you think each of the following is for being truly Irish?"... ... ..."to have been born in Ireland"
In each case, respondents were asked to rank their responses along a scale, in the case of the first six items, from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) and, in the case of the seventh item, from 1 (very important) to 4 (not at all important). The seventh item was reordered to make it consistent with the other six. Principal components analysis of these responses yielded two factors or underlying dimensions of nationalist attitudes. As can be seen from the rotated factor loadings in Table 2 , the first factor is a straightforward preference for and sense of the superiority of one's own country (here labelled patriotism). The second factor identifies a narrow or exclusive sense of nationality combined with a degree of chauvinism of the "my country right or Table 3 presents the results of a series of ordered probit regressions that were run explaining attitudes towards immigration. The dependent variable is the scaled response to the question mentioned earlier, which asked respondents whether they thought that the number of immigrants to their economy should be increased a lot (1), a little (2), remain the same (3), be reduced a little (4) or reduced a lot (5). Skill 345 is a binary variable which takes the value one if the respondent's skill level is either three, four or five, and zero if his or her skill level is one or two; the variable thus indicates whether the respondent is high-skilled or not. All equations include country dummy variables (coefficients not reported).
Explaining individual attitudes towards immigration
Equation (1) the coefficient on Skill345 should be positive in poor countries). It follows that the interaction term between Skill345 and GDP per capita should be negative: the high-skilled should be less anti-immigration in rich countries than in poor countries. 5 This prediction is broadly born out by the evidence in Table 3 : the interaction term is negative in all specifications, and significant in all but two (equations (4) and (6)).
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What about the Borjas theory? This predicts that in countries with less equal income distributions, immigration should predominantly involve skilled workers, while immigration should be biassed towards the unskilled in more egalitarian countries. Thus, as we move from 25 more equal societies to less equal ones, immigration should increasingly involve skilled workers, and skilled workers should become increasingly anti-immigration. That is, the coefficient on an interaction term between Skill345 and a measure of inequality should be positive; and this is indeed the case. The measure of inequality used here is simply the Gini coefficient, taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators. The Borjas theory is triumphantly vindicated, since the coefficient is positive and significant in all cases. Furthermore, the interaction term remains positive and significant when alternative measures of inequality are used, such as the ratio of the incomes of the richest 10% to the incomes of the poorest 20%, or the ratio of the incomes of the richest 20% to the incomes of the poorest 10% (regressions not shown here).
Results for the other variables are mixed. As expected, people who have previously lived abroad are significantly more liberal in their attitudes towards immigration, while there is weaker evidence that those who describe themselves as internationally mobile are similarly more liberal;
while the native-born, and those whose parents are native-born, are significantly more likely to favour immigration restrictions. Older people are more anti-immigration, although this is not true in all countries (and thus the effect vanishes in equation (5), which can only be estimated using data for some of the countries in our sample). Somewhat surprisingly, being unemployed has no effect on preferences either way.
Equations (4) through (6) test another implication of HO theory: that agents who are protectionist will also favour immigration restrictions. 'Protect' is the same variable as that given in Table 1 ; i.e. it contains responses to the question as to what extent respondents agreed with the statement that their country 'should limit the import of foreign products in order to protect its national economy,' with responses ordered from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). If 26 agents view trade and migration as substitutes, as HO theory suggests, then the coefficient on protect should be positive; and indeed it is, in all equations.
For some countries, we have information on a number of other variables, and these are included in equations (5) and (6). Equation (5) shows that rural residents are significantly more likely to be anti-immigration, as are trade union members. Being self-employed, or being a public sector worker, has no effect on attitudes. Equation (6) shows that respondents who place themselves on the right of the political spectrum are more likely to be anti-immigration than those who self-identify as left-wing.
Both the Borjas and the HO theories thus appear to be vindicated by the evidence.
However, it is worth noting that it is the Borjas theory which is the more robust, since the HO interaction term loses statistical significance in some specifications. It is also the case that both theories stand up better to the data when tested in a conditional form, than when tested unconditionally. For example, when equation (2) is re-run, omitting the interaction term between Skill345 and inequality, the interaction term between Skill345 and GDP per capita becomes statistically insignificant; while the interaction term between skill and inequality also loses its statistical significance when the interaction term between skills and per capita GDP is omitted (regressions not shown). The HO theory assumes that countries are identical in all respects other than their relative endowments of skilled and unskilled labour, and the prediction of the theory is thus very much a ceteris paribus one; once inequality has been controlled for, the HO results begin to come through in these regressions. Similarly, the Borjas theory does better once differences in GDP per capita have been controlled for.
Another approach to testing the HO and Borjas theories is to run a series of regressions 7 The country abbreviations used are given in Appendix Table 1. 27 explaining attitudes towards immigration in individual countries, and compare the coefficients on Skill345 across countries. We did this using the specification in equation (3) Of course, Figure 1 just plots the bivariate relationship between the Skill345 coefficient and GDP per capita; while the regressions in Table 3 control for a simultaneous relationship between the Skill345 coefficient and inequality. It appears that the evidence for the predictions of HO theory is weak when the unconditional version of that theory is tested; however, conditional on other factors the predictions of the theory hold up reasonably well. By contrast, the Borjas theory does well both when tested unconditionally, and when tested conditional on other factors.
Conclusions
The late 19 th century was a period of unprecedented intercontinental mass migration, which mostly involved unskilled workers. This mass migration helped poor countries along the European periphery to catch up with rich core countries such as the United States; and it also led 8 And indeed Collins, O'Rourke and Williamson (1999) show that trade and factors flows were more likely to have been complements than substitutes during this period.
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to more equal income distributions in those peripheral economies. Mass migration thus led to major economic benefits for poor countries, although these benefits were at the expense of widening income distributions in the New World. By contrast, the 20 th century saw much tighter immigration controls. Not only have these prevented mass migration from being a force for international convergence in our own period; by favouring the immigration of skilled workers, rich-country policies in recent years may have promoted a brain drain from developing countries, leading to divergence at the international level, and worsening income distributions within the developing world.
Understanding the evolution of rich-country policies towards immigration is thus an area of major practical concern. Immigration barriers began to be erected in the rich countries of the In order to test such a hypothesis, we would need measures of immigration policy that are consistent across countries. The striking difference between the amount of work that has been done trying to explain trade policy, and the amount of work on immigration policy, is presumably largely due to the fact that it is easier to measure the former than the latter (or, rather, it is easy to obtain average tariff data; whether these are a good measure of trade policy is another matter --see Anderson and Neary 1994) . True, asylum systems generate comparable data across countries, such as recognition rates for asylum applicants; but the extent to which this measures immigration policy per se, rather than differing commitments to countries' international human rights obligations, is open to question. A major research focus should thus be to generate cross-country panel data on immigration regimes -on their overall restrictiveness, and on the extent to which they are biassed in favour of skilled workers -which can then be analysed using econometric methods. A second focus should be the collection of better immigration statistics-to 19 th century historians, it is striking how patchy are today's migration data. A third focus should be to generate more internationally comparable data on the characteristics of immigrants -their educational attainment, for example, since migrants' skill levels are of crucial concern to policy makers, and are also important when testing various theories of migration. A fourth focus should be the collection of data on skill differentials which are easily comparable across countries, since the 19 th century experience suggests that these differentials could be important in explaining attitudes towards immigration. Finally, it would obviously be interesting to perform exercises such as the ones undertaken here using survey data for a series of years, in order to see how the determinants of attitudes towards immigration change over time; and in order to relate such changes to shifts in the economic and political environment.
While the agenda for researchers seems clear, the lessons for policy makers are more From the point of view of developing countries, the experience of the late 19 th century suggests that they are losing out by not being able to export surplus unskilled labour as peripheral European countries did a hundred years ago; the fact that some rich country policies are promoting skilled immigration only compounds their difficulties. Current rich country immigration policies increase the moral onus on the OECD to liberalise trade in 'sensitive'
products, and this point should be made forcefully by poorer countries in the context of international trade negotiations. 
